Gemora: Chulin: 111b

It was stated: (In the case of) fish served on a meat vessel. Rav said: It is forbidden to eat the fish with cheese. Shmuel said it was permitted. Rav said it was forbidden (since) the meat gives a taste (notan tam). Shmuel says it is permitted (since) the meat gives a secondary taste(notan tam bar notan tam).

....Hezekiah said in the name of Abaye: The Halacha is: Fish served on a meat vessel is permitted to eat with cheese. Tznon (a type of radish) which was cut with a knife used to cut meat, is prohibited to eat with a cheese dish. [That is specifically tznon since its sharpness absorbs the taste of meat], however, in the case of squash, (just) clean the surface where it was cut and then eat it with cheese.

Explanation :

The Torah forbids a combination of meat and milk or a combination of heter and eisor in two cases:

1. When both substances in the combination are actually present (mumashut).
2. When the taste of the substance is in the other (notan ta'am) even if it is not actually present.

The Chochomim fix this level where taste is present at one part in sixty. When one part of the issur is found in less than sixty parts of the heter; they establish that the issur imparts its taste into the mixture, and makes the whole mixture prohibited (osser). If there is more than sixty parts of the heter to one part of issur, they declare that there is no taste or that the taste is nullified or disregarded (botel).There is a disagreement (machlocus) between Rishonim if this rule which we call ta'am c'eiker (taste is like the thing itself) is a Torah law (d'oraisah) or a Rabbinic enactment (m'd'rabbonon).

The Gemora sugiah is concerned with "not bar not" (the abbreviation of notan ta'am bar notan ta'am); where the taste is a secondary taste.

For example the cases in our Gemora:

1. Fish is served or cooked in a vessel in which meat was previously cooked. The meat or the vessel was hot enough for the meat taste to be transferred into the vessel. The vessel now has a principal taste of meat. If fish is then placed in the vessel, and either the vessel or fish were hot enough to transfer taste, the fish receives the secondary taste of the meat (the vessel having the primary taste)

2. In the second case, a knife was used to cut hot meat and thus received a primary taste of meat. Latter on during the same day the knife was use to cut tznon. The tzon thus received a secondary meat taste.

Rav states that it is forbidden (osser ) to eat the fish with cheese. Shmuel states that it is permitted (mutar). Abaya states that the fish may be eaten with cheese but not the tznon.

On the face of it Rav's reasoning is clear: Once there is a taste of issur in a substance what difference does it make if that taste is a principal or secondary one. The heter of Shmuel, however, requires explanation. For since there is not sixty parts of fish to nullify (mvatel) the taste of meat imparted by the vessel, why is "not bar not" permitted?

Simply it seems that Shmuel holds that not bar not is a ta'am clusha (a weak, or ineffective taste). This could either mean that:

1. Such a weak taste does not impart a taste that is significant and therefore it is, in effect, not tasted. This being the reason that it is permitted.

2. Alternatively, he could hold that a not bar not taste is not halachically considered a taste of eiser but rather a taste of heter even when the issur can apparently still be tasted. In other words, when the Torah or the Rabbis forbade ta’am c’ikur  (the taste of issur) it was only limited to a principal and not a secondary taste.

Three clarifications must be made in the case of a vessel about which the halachah states that not bar not is permitted:

Preface:There are three levels of contact between the fish and the meat vessel by which a taste of meat could be imparted into the fish:

1. The first is eiroyi (pouring one onto another).
2. The second is bishul (cooking).
3. The third is Tzli (roasting).

Question 1. Does the heter of not bar not apply only to the first level? For in the first level the degree of contact, and therefore the extent to which the taste of issur may be transferred, is lessened. Or does the heter apply to the second or third levels as well?

A. The first view: The language of the Gemora is that fish was served on a vessel which had absorbed the taste of meat and either the fish or the vessel (or both) were sufficiently hot to transfer the taste. The first view holds that only in this case where the fish was served and not cooked does Shmuel permit not bar not since the taste's transfer between the vessel and the fish only comes from contact and therefore is not so great.

B. The second view is that Shmuel would permit not bar not even if the fish was cooked in the meat vessel, regardless of the fact that there was a greater transfer of taste from the meat absorbed in the vessel.

C. The third view is that Shmuel would allow not bar not (that is to eat the fish with cheese) even where the fish was roasted or fried in the vessel without any addition of liquid. Roasting or frying would certainly increase the transfer of the taste even more than cooking.

The following objection could be raised against views B and C: If the Gemora wanted to permit not bar not even by cooking or roasting, then it should not have used the language of "alu" which means placing or pouring without cooking. However, we can remove this objection by explaining that the statement comes to show us the strength of Rav. For Rav would maintain a strict (machmir) view and forbid not bar not even in such an easy or linient (makil) case. Shmuel, on the other hand, would be makil even in the cases of cooking or roasting.

Question 2. The next question for clarification is whether the heter of not bar not is solely a din in boser b’halav or whether it also applies to other issurim (prohibitions). Do we say that exclusively in boser b’halav, where each of the components are mutar on their own, do we allow such a heter, but in other prohibitions (sha’ar isorim) where the taste of the actual issur is present, we do not permit not bar not, or do we say say in both cases the heter applies?

Question 3. The third clarification is whether the rule of not bar not is l'hatchilah (allowed even in the first instance) or only b'dieved (allowed only after the fact). In other words, whether one is permitted l'hatchilah to place or cook fish in a meat vessel in order to eat it with cheese or whether it is only after the fish was placed or cooked in the vessel (which itself is of course mutar) that then b'dieved it can be eaten with cheese. There is a further question concerning the case of b'dieved which is even more machmir: Even after the fish was put or cooked in the vessel, is it forbidden l'hatchila to eat it with cheese or only b'dieved if it was already mixed with cheese is it permitted to eat? This question is again an argument (machlokus) among the Rishonim.

Answers:

As to the first question, the degree of contact between the fish and the meat vessel, the Rivan and Rabbenu Tam learn Rashi's opinion in two ways.

a. According to the Rivan the only thing permitted is placing the fish in the meat vessel.
b. According to Rebbeinu Tam even cooking or roasting the fish in the meat vessel is permitted.

The Rivan has a strong proof for his opinion from Rashi's explanation of the case of the knife used to cut meat and then tznon. The tznon is forbidden because it is charif (pungent) and brings out much more of the meat taste which was absorbed in the knife than the other vegetable. Surely cooking in a vessel which brings out the taste absorbed in the vessel and transfers it into the fish must be forbidden. For cooking is a greater force than the pungent nature (charifut) of the tznon which brought the taste out of the knife. Therefore, a proof can be brought from here that Rashi holds that only placing the fish in the meat vessel is permitted and cooking would be forbidden.

Rabbeinu Tam, on the other hand, learns Rashi differently. In explaining the expression not bar not Rashi states that if the fish were cooked with actual meat it would be forbidden to eat  with cheese. Since Rashi gives the example of "cooking" together, it is possible to infer that if the first was cooked in a vessel which only had the taste of meat it would be permitted, according to Shmuel. As to the case of the tznon, Rabbeinu Tam relies on the second explanation of Rashi that the reason why the tznon is forbidden is because of the fatty substances of meat which are left on the knife but not seen and are absorbed into the tznon. Tznon is charif and absorbs more easily than fish and the absorbtion is assisted by the pressure of the knife. Both of these factors are necessary for the tznon to absorb the unseen fatty particles which give a primary meat taste. It would therefore be forbidden to eat it with cheese. Neither of these factors apply to fish.

It can be explained that the Rivan holds that Rashi was in doubt as to the limit of the heter of not bar not i.e. whether it was just placing the fish in the vessel or even cooking. The Rivan therefore himself holds l'chumreh to limit it to the first case. Rabbeinu Tam, on the other hand, holds that the second view that even cooking is permitted, is a certain din both for Rashi and himself.

The key to understanding the sugiah is found in the chakirah of the Rosh Yosef. Rav's reason is simple - not bar not is oser because there remains the ta'am of eisur. Shmuel however can be explained in two ways :

a. On one side it can be said that in not bar not the taste is weakened to such a great extent by virtue of the second removal from the source of eisur that we say that it can be assumed (m'stumah) that there is no taste of eissur. Rav would say that the question of whether there is an issur is to be determined in accordance with the normal rules of bitul i.e. a proportion of one in less than sixty is osser, one in more than sixty is mutar. Shmuel says that this case is different i.e. when there is not bar not it can be assumed that there is no such taste even if the proportion is less than sixty against one.

b. On the other side Shmuel will say that there is a din that not bar not is mutar  i.e. that even if there is a taste, it is a taste of heter and not of issur.

According to this chakira, the Rosh Yosef makes two nufka minot (legal differences)

a. If it is possible to taste the ta'am even in a not bar not, then according to the first side of the chakirah it will be forbidden, because there is, in practice, a taste of issur even though it is not bar not. In such a case, even Shmuel would agree that it was forbidden. According to the second view, such a taste does not concern us, because it is not a taste of issur but a taste of heter.

b. Concerning issurim which are not botel even in a thousand, for example, spices or an entire entity in the form that it was created (beriah); If the heter is because of the absence of taste, then the absence of taste will not help because by definition the mixture is osser even if there is no taste for in such cases there is no rule of bitul. If, however, the din is that not bar not is a permitted taste, here too in these cases it would be permitted.

It is possible to clarify the three questions stated above with this chakira:

a. If we say that the reason is based on the assumption that there is no taste, then only in the weaker case of putting the fish in the meat vessel can we make this assumption, but cooking or direct heat would be osser since it is more likely to transfer taste. If it is a din that the taste in muttar, then it makes no difference what degree of transference takes place, for it is a transfer of heter.

b. If it is a question of a weak taste (ta'am klusha) that cannot be tasted, then no difference can be made between boser b’halev and sha’ar issurim. Since the heter depends on taste, the sole question is whether there is a taste or not. If however there is a din that the taste of nor bar not is mutar, it is understandable that the Rabbis would permit not bar not in boser b’halav where each of the elements in the combination are permitted on their own and only the combination are forbidden, but not in sha'ar issurim. For with boser b'halav the Rabbis could delineate the taste of not bar not as a permitted taste; but not in sha’ar issurim where there is a taste of actual issur, which could not in any circumstances be called a ta'am of heter.

c. Finally, if the heter is based on ta'am then we would say that the rule that not bar not is permitted is only b'dieved, for how can we permit someone to put a taste of meat (albeit a secondary taste) with cheese. On the other hand if it is a din, then there would be no objection even l'hatchila for the taste of meat in the fish is a permitted taste.

We can also apply this chakira to a machlokos of Rashi and Tosefos in the sugia. The Gemora states that the rule of Rav i.e. not bar not is oser was not stated by him specifically but derived from a case. Rav visited by a Rabbi, had eye ache, they heated up ointment in a vessel for his eye and then cooked a dish (tavshil) for him in the same vessel. He said that he could taste the ointment in the food. Apparently this is the source of the statement that Rav holds that not bar not would be oser. The Gemora replies, not so, ointment is different because it is bitter.

According to Rashi, the Gemora when it says "not so", it means that it rejects the proof of Rav, i.e. that according to Shmuel the fact that it is possible to taste the ointment in a not bar not does not mean we could taste meat in the fish, for ointment is different because it is stronger. This explanation fits well with the side of the chakirah that the dispute is whether we assume there is a taste or not. Rav says we do, he tasted the ointment in the food, and he does not distinguish between ointment and other foods. Shmuel says we do not, ointment is different because it is bitter.

According to Tosefos, the Gemora when it says "not so" rejects the statement that Rav's view is inferred from the case of the ointment . Rav’s view was stated expressly and not learnt from the story of the ointment . According to Tosefos, Rav would agree that ointment is different because it is bitter. The dispute between Rav and Shmuel is therefore expressed in the case of fish, and fits well with the side of the chakirah that the issue between them is din. The view that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel concerns a ta'am klusha as seen in the case of the ointment was only a possibility (hava aminah ) which the Gemora rejected ..